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Recent years have brought new challenges to contemporary democratic societies, which 
seem to be submerged in a crisis widely acknowledged. Our paper aims to consider 
potential solutions to these problems, reassessing the benefits of federalism in diverse 
matters, such as the control of abuses of power, the promotion of popular involvement in 
the decision-making process, the reappraisal of the notion of citizenship, the reorganization 
of parties, the protection of minorities and adaptation to globalization. 
 




1. The challenges to contemporary democracy 
  
The concept of modern democracy has its roots in the great liberal revolutions of the 
18th century and it is linked to a set of principles today widely recognized, including the 
existence of free elections, political representation, a multiparty system, a limited 
government, the rule of law (as the expression of popular will), separation of powers (with 
independent courts), the separation of Church and State and the protection of 
several individual rights.  
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Although indispensable to the maintenance of present democracies (and still pertinent in 
areas of the globe where such principles are only partially practiced), these elements have 
nevertheless been insufficient to fully cope with the new challenges posed by contemporary 
democratic societies, namely in western countries where such principles are respected, but 
the democratic aspirations of the people still seem in several ways somewhat unanswered. 
Despite the broad nature of such challenges, we can identify some of the most important 
ones: 
i) Globalization. The birth of modern democracy occurred concomitantly with the rise 
of the nation-state. Therefore, the institutional framework of the first modern democratic 
experiences created mainly uniform legal guidelines to sustain a central administration, 
necessary to guarantee solid foundations to the democratic state. However, the recent 
emergence of political realities that require a strong cooperation between states (such as 
massive migrations, intensive international trade, shared monetary policies, environmental 
problems, etc.), clearly demand new types of institutional relationships, notably some form 
of supra-national connections, which modern democracies seem unprepared to deal with 
due to their unitary original nature. 
ii) The rise of minorities. Almost inexistent when the first modern democratic 
experiences took place, religious and ethnic minorities currently represent a considerable 
and growing population amidst democratic societies. Nevertheless, since democracies are 
essentially based in the principle of the ruling majority, such minorities have been 
repeatedly excluded from the most important political organs as well as the decision-
making process altogether. To find a place for minorities in the democratic compound 
remains one of the hardest and yet most urgent challenges of contemporary politics. 
iii) The unchecked growth of economic powers. Indispensable to the common 
functioning of modern democracies, economic agents (taken in a broad sense, and therefore 
including banks, corporations, markets, investors, etc.) have grown fast in the past century 
–strongly benefiting from deregulation and ambiguous laws– to the point that the hardcore 
of political activity is now highly subordinated to economic powers. Since such powers 
frequently exist outside the institutional framework, and/or exercise their influence through 
channels exempt (or simply out of reach) from any political or legal control, they pose a 
substantial threat to present-day democracies.  
iv) The predominance of political party “machines” in the public sphere. Although the 
existence of political parties has been long recognized as a distinctive mark of a sound 
democracy, the peculiar mode in which parties intervene nowadays in the political process 
generates several problems to democracy, the most relevant of which is the way they limit 
the participation of common people in politics. By transforming themselves in the only 
effective intermediary between society at large and the political practice, parties erected an 
almost insurmountable barrier to the citizens who wish to join the decision-making 
processes, without belonging to such parties.  
v) The persistent abuses of power. Phenomena such as corruption, nepotism and 
political patronage have always been present in the democratic experience. Nonetheless, 
their recurrence –and perhaps even increase– in recent years have notoriously damage 
democracy’s efficiency. If taken together with one of the worse effects of the dominance of 
party machines in present democracies (the decrease of political actors’ accountability, who 
seem to answer more directly to party leaderships than to the people who elect them), such 
forms of political malpractice have contributed to the increase of negative views on 
democracy in the public opinion. 
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These and other factors have lead to a progressive weakening of current democracies, 
controlled by incapable political elites and marked by a growing distance between the 
citizens and the political deliberation process. Our paper aims to consider potential 




2. The nature of federalism 
 
To evaluate the prospective benefits of federalism to democracy, we need initially to 
clarify its true meaning, widely misrepresented both in the academic and political fields, 
which have persistently confounded federalism with the process leading to a centralization 
of political power, binding several states into a superstate (in the deceitful words of 
Margaret Thatcher1), that would swallow all the political authorities into one giant vortex, a 
solitary political construction wholly controlled by an all-powerful central government. 
Such misleading characterization of federalism is still reproduced nowadays, especially by 
political actors very critical of European integration, and pervades occasionally even the 
scholarly debate over the kind of system federalism entangles2. 
These portrayals of federalism are unsustainable as we dig into a full account of its true 
meaning. Deriving from the Latin words fides (trust) and foedus (pact, agreement), the 
concept of federalism implies a cooperative relation between several entities with common 
goals, which leads to a political union with a central government that coexist side-by-side 
with concurrent power structures inherent to the members that form such union. In a federal 
association, the political decisions don’t emanate therefore from one single superstructure, 
but occur within a matrix of concomitant power entities that are permanently connected to 
each other. In the words of Daniel Elazar, one of the leading scholars of federalism in the 
20th century,  
 
Federal principles are concerned with the combination of self-rule and shared rule. […] As a 
political principle, federalism has to do with the constitutional diffusion of power so that the 
constituting elements in a federal arrangement share in the processes of common policy making 
and administration by right, while the activities of the common government are conducted in such 
a way as to maintain their respective integrities3. 
  
As a compound arrangement, federalism doesn't imply a consolidation of the 
constituent parts in a sole structure and surely doesn't involve the inevitable transformation 
of a set of states in a one-dimensional political organization. Federal systems are based 
exactly in the opposite idea: an agreement between political entities that maintain an 
identical formal standing, although they are bound in a common whole. Such union must 
have a gravity center (that holds them together), but it contains a wide field of 
complementary powers. Although particular organs have paramount authority in specific 
matters, federalism is by nature polyarchical. Its modus operandi is based in the 
collaboration between various political units, which are not subsumed under a unique 
authority, but instead preserved as constituent parts of a multiform building.  
 
1 Thatcher, Margareth, Speech to the College of Europe (Bruges, 20/09/1988), URL 
<http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107332> 
2 See, for instance, Galloway, David, The Treaty of Nice and Beyond, Sheffield Academic Press, 2001; and 
also Szczerbiak, Aleks and Taggart, Paul, Opposing Europe?, Oxford University Press, 2008. 
3 Elazar, Daniel, Exploring Federalism, The University of Alabama Press, 1987, pp. 5-6. 
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In a clear contrast with unitarian forms of government –typically set in a fixed 
hierarchy, with political processes occurring mainly across vertical decision axes’ (where a 
highly centralized government acts directly upon the whole territory under its supervision), 
federalist associations chiefly depend on horizontal connections and shared decisions 
between different political authorities. Even if it creates a central government (for purposes 
of efficiency in the pursuit of mutual objectives), federalism permanently relies upon an 
inter-institutional communication between various equidistant power organizations, which 
are encouraged to act together in the pursuit of common solutions to common problems, 
within the scope of their competences. 
 
 
3. The benefits of federalism to democracy 
 
With the proper meaning of federalism clarified, we can concentrate on the reasons why 
we believe it may contribute to the promotion of democratic values (nowadays endangered 
by the challenges previously enumerated).  
 
 3.1. Checks and balances 
 
A first relevant aspect of federalism is the fact that it represents one of the most efficient 
checks and balances of political action, as it multiplies the vigilance mechanisms of a 
democratic system. By creating additional levels of government –enshrined in the main 
political structure– federalism not only divides power among several organisms (thereby 
avoiding the concentration of authority in a single distant and potentially abusive branch), 
but also stimulates the various power structures to oversee each other. Relying on the 
wariness nature of authority, federalism promotes a zealous caution between political 
actors, as they try to avoid encroachments on their specific prerogatives, which tends 
therefore to maintain the political action within a realm of restricted competences. As it 
increases the number of players in the political system, federalism creates thus an 
indispensable safeguard against an abuse of power that could endanger democracy: 
 
[…] federalism is politically sound because of its compound features […]; by providing for a 
constitutional diffusion of power, federalism enables “ambition to counteract ambition” for the 
good of the body politic and prevents the consolidation of ambition to the latter’s detriment4. 
 
Elazar’s reference to a famous James Madison’s expression (“ambition to counteract 
ambition”5) seems especially appropriate, given Madison’s reflection on the ability of 
federalism to protect the common good by taking advantage of the negative traits of human 
nature (as the thirst of power and control), which can be used in the proper institutional 
outline (that federalism aims to build) to reinforce mutual vigilance between political 
agents and structures. This happens precisely because the personal interest of politicians 
and institutions in the maintenance of their jurisdiction propels them to watch carefully 
against unlawful threats to it. 
 
4 Elazar, Daniel, op. cit., p. 29. 
5 “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the 
constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to 
control the abuses of government.”, Madison, James, The Federalist number 51, The Papers of James Madison, 
Congressional Series, vol. 10, The University of Chicago Press, 1977, p. 477. 
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Contemporary analysis on the benefits of federalism also commonly resort to the 
negativity of human nature as they trace egotistical features that can nevertheless be used to 
favor public interest. A good example is the work of Nobel Laureate Roger Myerson, who 
has sustained in a recent paper that “the forces of democratic competition may be sharpened 
by the national ambitions of local leaders”6. Using theoretical models to evaluate the 
behavior of political leaders in federalist systems, Myerson found that the federal division 
of powers foments healthy and successful governance, since it creates an additional and 
strong incentive for provincial leaders, who wish to create a good reputation as they crave a 
future role at a national level. In a unitary system, ambitious politicians can easily taint 
public policy with their personal interest, but in a federal model that gives effective power 
at multiple levels, the fierce competition among political actors generates a motive and an 
opportunity to promote good democratic practices, channeling personal ambitions into the 
establishment of outstanding public careers7. 
 
 3.2. Popular participation 
 
Moreover, since federalism upholds decentralization and the principle of subsidiarity 
(the idea that in a political complex organism, the superior structures should only act if the 
matters at hand cannot be efficiently executed by the subordinate units), the powers and 
rights of the governments nearest to the communities are reinforced. This can be very 
important to the promotion of democratic values for two reasons. 
First, because it amplifies representation, by encouraging dynamics of proximity 
between the political actors and the common citizens, who can see their needs more quickly 
answered, due to the existence of significant units of decision closer to them. At the same 
time, the responsibility of the political agents in face of their constituents is increased, as 
the public decisions tend to be connected with familiar names, and no longer to distant and 
often unidentified political officers. Federalism thus emphasizes political accountability, 
creating stronger links between representatives and represented, allowing for a better 
communication among them and raising also the chances to punish (or reward) those who 
were more personally and directly incapable (or capable) to protect the common good and 
the interests of the people. 
On the other hand, through decentralization federalism can maximize popular 
participation in political affairs. It does so by creating more government structures, and 
consequently more opportunities for citizens to influence the decision-making processes. 
Due to its natural predisposition to diffusive administrative patterns, federalism creates thus 
several stages for political organization, engagement and mobilization. Such provisions do 
not guarantee per se an increase of popular involvement in politics, but “they offer at least 
an additional and better chance of active participation”8, particularly compelling to the 
people because a large part of substantive policy-making takes place at a local level, which 
is more accessible to common citizens and where the effects of the political process are 
much more visible, as Mark Tushnet points out: 
 
 
6 Myerson, Roger, “Federalism and Incentives for Success of Democracy”, Quarterly Journal of Political 
Science, 2006, 1, p. 5. 
7 Ibid., p. 5 et passim. 
8 Hrbek, Rudolf, “Exploring Federalism: Europe and the Federal Experience. Reflections at the Beginning of 
the Nineties”, in Brown-John, C. Lloyd (ed.), Federal-Type Solutions and European Integration, University Press 
of America, 1995, pp. 556-567. 
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Federalism promotes participation because […] people find it easier to engage in political action 
in smaller jurisdictions: the smaller the jurisdiction, the more likely it is that a person's political 
action will actually affect policy, and the clearer it will be to the voter that his or her participation 
actually made a difference9. 
 
The increase of popular participation, even if it occurs initially only at a local level, can 
produce further benefits in the long term, due to its pedagogic effects. For such 
participation ensures character formation through discussion and deliberation, promotes the 
idea of a public and open society, and creates more vigorous citizens, who after the 
experience at the local level, will be more willing to participate in other stages of political 
action (namely in the state or national governments)10.  
 
 3.3. Citizenship revisited 
 
By establishing a social and political network that rests upon a clear principle of civic 
intervention, federalism provides a return to the genuine meaning of democracy, as the 
“government of the people, by the people, and for the people” (in the famous words of 
Abraham Lincoln), because it celebrates the capacity (and the right) of each individual (or 
small communities) to assume a seminal participation in the decisions that affect directly 
their quotidian lives. Hence, federalism allows to reappraise the notion of citizenship, no 
longer understood merely as the individual right to the full dominion of his private actions 
(or to be free from State intervention), but primarily as his right (and, to some extent, duty) 
to actively take part in the collective decisions of the public realm.  
Present in several contemporary theoretical works (namely by authors of the so-called 
“Communitarian School”11), this idea has, in fact, always been an essential feature of the 
historical reflections on federalism and democracy. Let’s briefly recall, for instance, 
Thomas Jefferson’s observations on these matters. Having contributed directly in his early 
days to the triumph of democracy in the USA, Jefferson was later in life somewhat 
disappointed with the lack of popular participation in the political process. In his 
correspondence, he speaks of a proposal to address that problem, consisting in the creation 
of a large system of wards –small units of government that encouraged a direct public 
involvement in several political decisions of a specific local nature. More than mere 
electoral districts, the wards would have resembled the historical practice of town hall 
meetings, whereby every member of the local community voiced their opinions about 
shared subjects of interest. To Jefferson, wards would then represent genuine spaces of 
public discussion, allowing each individual to directly participate in the management of 
local affairs, making them the true bulwarks of a republican system: 
 
Each ward would thus be a small republic within itself, and every man in the State would thus 
become an acting member of the common government, transacting in person a great portion of its 
rights and duties [...]. The wit of man cannot devise a more solid basis for a free, durable and well 
administered republic12. 
 
9 Tushnet, Mark, “Federalism as a Cure for Democracy’s Discontent?”, in Allen, Anita and Regan, Milton 
(Eds.), Debating Democracy's Discontent. Essays on American Politics, Law, and Public Philosophy, Oxford 
University Press, 1998, p. 308. 
10 Ibid., p. 308. 
11 Cf. Wilfred McClay “Communitarianism and the Federal Idea”, in Lawler, Peter and McConkey, Dale 
(eds.), Community and Political Thought Today, Praeger, 1998, pp. 101-108; see also Sandel, Michael, Public 
Philosophy: Essays on Morality in Politics, Harvard University Press, 2005, especially pp. 9-34 and 156-173. 
12 Letter of Thomas Jefferson to John Cartwright, June 5, in Jefferson, Thomas, Writings, Library of America, 
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Jefferson’s concept of wards seems to comprise a return to the idea of polis in Ancient 
Greece. His primary intent was to cultivate each individual’s fulfilment through an active 
exercise of citizenship, which could only occur in the plural context of the commonwealth. 
The ward could have been (since it was never implemented) the public space that allowed 
each individual to act as a citizen, that is, as a singular participant that intervenes in a 
collective political decision process. The former highlights the right of each person to self-
government, but only the latter gives meaning to such right, by incorporating it in the public 
life and the political practice of a larger community.   
 
3.4. Changes in the party system 
 
Federalism can also produce relevant democratic improvements in the way political 
parties operate, decentralizing their organization and their political platform. Through the 
powers they convey to political actors located at different points in the various government 
structures, federal systems can reshape the nature of party competition and the incentives 
for politicians, forcing a greater adaptation to regional and local necessities. On the other 
hand, the already mentioned model of proximity between representatives and constituents, 
typical of federalism, contributes to a larger accordance of political actions and the true 
interests of common citizens. In federal systems, parties are therefore more connected and 
dependable of popular opinion than in unitary countries, where party organizations –due to 
its wider and national facet– usually demand a stronger and rigid centralized leadership. 
The American case illustrates the advantages of federalism in this matter. Due to the 
ample cultural, social and ideological differences of the states, the political parties are 
highly decentralized organizations, since they have to adapt themselves to the changing 
priorities of the electorate. Hence, the Democratic Party structures in the South are much 
more conservative than their counterparts in the Western Coast, for instance (the same is 
valid for the Republican Party). Besides, the complex features of the federal compound 
(with multiple decision-making devices) demand of parties great flexibility (in questions of 
ideology, but also of organization and composition), in a general landscape where exist 
“[…] plenty of scope for party-state dissonance regarding presidential, congressional, 
gubernatorial and local state elections and representation”13.  
Since they dominate the vast majority of political organs at a national level, it may seem 
these two parties are in fact massive and centralized organizations. But, in truth, they are 
the result of a broad coalition of local and state structures, with different messages, political 
discourse or even electoral strategies, necessary to win votes in diverse regions of the 
federation. National parties in the USA are then quite fragile –partly because of weak party 
discipline and the personalization of politics– but mainly due to the diversity of their 
political views, which in this case favors democratic principles, as the parties search for 
popular approbation by accommodating themselves to the people’s (different and wide) 






1984, pp. 1492-1493. 
13 Burgess, Michael, Comparative Federalism. Theory and Practice, Routledge, 2006, p. 152. 
14 Cf. Burgess, op. cit., p. 152. 
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3.5 Pluralism, minorities and globalization 
 
Another important aspect of federalism is how it fosters pluralism, a quintessential mark 
of democracy, by facilitating the access of minorities to the political process, as noted by 
Rudolf Hrbek:  
 
Minorities […] may have a stronghold at regional level which would give them better 
opportunities to promote their case within the national organization. […] A federal structure 
makes it easier for minorities to gain ground, to grow up and to consolidate at a regional level. 
[…] A federal structure forbids to marginalize minorities15.  
 
In a unitary political model, minorities find great difficulties to push their agenda, due 
to its scarce relevance when compared with general issues that concern the majority. On 
the contrary, a federal arrangement –which contains multiple levels of government, 
including a territorial division of power– widens the chances of specific groups to make 
their voice heard, especially if the demographic weight of those groups is, in a particular 
region, proportionally superior to their representation at a national level. In such cases, the 
existence of a specific political unit with reserved powers is indispensable to protect such 
minorities against the superiority of the many, allocated in the national bodies. That is the 
reason why many federal systems adopt special protection clauses to minority groups who 
wish to preserve their culture or language (see Belgium, Switzerland or Canada), endowing 
certain states (or regions) with significant autonomy or even a virtual veto power on 
relevant policy issues.  
The idea that federalism can promote democratic values by protecting minority rights is 
a constant aspect in the treatment of these matters. We find it in James Madison’s 
celebrated theory of the “extended republic”, a defence of social and political diversity as 
the most adequate instrument to cope with the existence of factions (groups motivated by 
particular interests), which in a plural environment have fewer chances to constitute an 
abusive majority against the interests of smaller groups16. We see it in Arend Lijphart’s 
works, where federalism is listed as one of the most effective mechanism in consociational 
democracies, protecting minorities against elected majorities through the creation of 
political subunits with substantial sovereignty, where an ethnic or cultural minority has a 
specific predominance17. And we find it also in Daniel Elazar’s thought, who emphasizes 
the importance of “compounded majoritarianism” for democracy, i.e., the fact that political 
majorities should primarily be composed of several minorities or confederated groups 
(which would “govern by consensus”), and not of a unique cultural or ideological faction 
which gains institutional predominance18.  
All these authors agree that federalism can be useful for minorities in a dual sense. For 
at the same time it can create for minorities an immunity barrier against abuses, federalism 
may also promote its integration in the national political process, because federal systems 
require a permanent cooperation between the several political structures that encompass a 
federal union, thus leading to concerted resolutions both on state and national issues. 
 
 
15 Hrbek, Rudolf, “Exploring Federalism: Europe and the Federal Experience. Reflections at the Beginning of 
the Nineties”, op. cit., p. 557. 
16 Madison, James, The Federalist number 10, op. cit., pp. 263-270. 
17 Lijphart, Arend, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration, Yale University Press, 1977. 
18 Elazar, Daniel, op. cit., p. 263. 
 José Gomes ANDRÉ                             
 
 
BAJO PALABRA. Revista de Filosofía 
II Época, Nº 9 (2014):85-94                                                                                                     
 
93
The ability of federal systems to promote collaboration between various entities in 
search of common goals –and to build reasonable consensus among multiple institutions 
with often divergent interests– is indeed perhaps the strongest asset of federalism, making it 
suitable to many situations in which diversity exists (whether of a cultural, social or 
political nature), and where nevertheless some sort of agreement and common effort needs 
to be found and developed. With its reliance in cooperation, free debate and institutional 
negotiation, federalism seems therefore appropriate not only to uphold democratic values 
within countries, but also among them. Preferring partnership and mutualism to 
subordination or external impositions, federalism is primordially a dialogic political 
exercise, and in this sense it can operate both at a micro (national) and a macro 
(supranational) level. 
In the present international scene new linkages between states, governments and citizens 
are constantly appearing, rising diverse challenges that need comprehensible answers. 
Globalization has lead to colossal progresses in science, technology, transportation, 
commerce and information, but still lacks innovative achievements in the political realm. 
Perhaps federalism could be particularly useful in this matter, because it can create the kind 
of institutional connections avidly solicited by the new global order, preserving and 
bolstering democratic principles inherently attached to its procedures, based on 
collaboration, open discussion and shared decisions19. 
 
 
4. A few conclusive remarks 
 
We have seen how federalism can promote democratic values in a wide range of 
matters, but despite such analysis it is important to state that such idea doesn’t constitute a 
definitive solution to democracy’s problems –only an instrument to tackle them. That is the 
case, first and obviously, because democracy is a reality too complex to be sustained in a 
single concept or political framework; but secondly, due to federalism’s own imperfections, 
namely when considered as a potential mechanism to address democracy’s deficiencies.  
One of such flaws is the incapacity of federalism to effectively control the relevance of 
economic powers in modern democracies. This happens mainly because these powers 
usually circumvent the political framework, to which federal institutions are strictly 
attached. In practical terms, these can enhance cooperation between countries and 
supranational organisms, but even such instruments of superintendence are often incapable 
of properly oversee the external pressures of markets, banks, loan companies and other 
economic agents. 
Federalism is also quite inefficient in dealing with political bureaucracy and the weight 
of the administrative processes-growing problems of contemporary democracies, which in 
fact are only enlarged by federalism. Federal systems are by definition polycentric, 
demanding a multiplication of agencies, institutions and offices in the political structure of 
a nation (or supranational configurations). The existence of this wide network of organisms 
and actors naturally brings with it an increase in bureaucracy, creating moreover so many 
layers of policy-making processes that both the outside observer and the agents belonging 
to that matrix find it hard to fully understand the several steps of political deliberation in 
such systems. 
 
19 Cf. Burgess, Michael, Comparative Federalism. Theory and Practice, op. cit., especially the chapter 
“Federalism, democracy and the state in the era of globalization”, pp. 251-268. See also Held, David, “The 
Transformation of Political Community: Rethinking Democracy in the Context of Globalization” in Ian Shapiro 
and Casiano Hacker-Corson (Eds.), Democracy's Edge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 84-111. 
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Finally, and perhaps more importantly, it must be noted that federalism doesn’t have an 
indisputable validity or normative soundness that guarantee its efficiency, as Edward 
Gibson reminds us:   
 
[…] federalism is not an outcome or end of the democratizing process, but a variable that interacts 
with democratization –strengthening democratization at some levels and inhibiting the operation 
of democratic government at others. Federalism and democracy are linked not ontologically, but 
via institutional mechanisms20.  
 
Since federalism does not have an ontological or moral intrinsic value, it can therefore 
only be seen as an auxiliary mechanism, and not as a panacea for democracies’ problems. 
The great flexibility of federalism –for it can be adopted with several institutional nuances 
(various legal outlines, different types of distribution of powers, diverse composition of 
federal organs, etc.)– makes it a helpful instrument in a wide range of political, cultural and 
social circumstances. Nonetheless, in spite of its promising advantages, federalism remains 
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